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Migration, Remittances and Moral Hazard.




This article uses recent survey data from the Kayes area (Western Mali) to estimate the effect of migration and
remittances on the technical efficiency of agricultural households. A theoretical model is developed, which
shows that the more insurance is provided by the migrants, the less incentive their families have to work. A
production function using panel data with household-specific fixed effects is estimated to test this hypothesis.
The probability of being financially supported by migrants is found to significantly contribute to technical
inefficiency. This result should help agricultural policy makers formulate more efficient development strategies
in the area.
Résumé
Cet article s'intéresse à la question de l'impact de la migration et des transferts sur le développement rural, dans
le cas de la région de Kayes (Mali). L'analyse descriptive des données d'une enquête réalisée dans la zone
montre que, malgré le réinvestissement manifeste d'une partie des revenus migratoires dans l'activité agricole,
la situation qui prévaut se caractérise par une production stagnante. Partant de ce constat, un modèle théorique
est proposé, visant à montrer formellement que la persistance d'une agriculture à faibles rendements résulte du
comportement de collecte de rente des familles bénéficiant des transferts, dans un contexte d'asymétrie
informationnelle. Ce comportement est appréhendé à travers une analyse de l'efficience technique des
exploitations agricoles. Les résultats des estimations vont dans le sens des prédictions du modèle.
Keywords : Migration, risk-coping strategy, moral hazard, technical inefficiency
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1- Introduction
The role of migration and remittances in rural development is a very controversial matter.
According to Lipton (1980), migration has three damaging effects on the economies of origin.
First, migration is overwhelmingly concentrated among young men and deprives those who
stay of productive workers and potential innovators. More, and harder, work by women and
children is needed to replace absent young men, which pushes down rural output per worker.
Second, remittances are unlikely to finance productive and labour-saving investments. Rather,
priority goes to everyday needs, which often absorb a large part of a village's remittances.
Third, the funds received allow the remaining villagers to achieve a given level of living with
less effort and thus encourage them to substitute leisure for effort. Unlike Lipton, Stark (1991)
argues that migration, by relaxing the credit and risk constraints faced by agricultural
households through remittances, could contribute to technological change and rural
development.
As far as migration and remittances are concerned, the Kayes area (Western Mali) is of great
interest. Characterised by high emigration rates and stagnant agricultural production, this
administrative region of Mali perfectly fits, at first sight, the pessimistic view according to
which migration would hamper rural development. A more careful examination of the rural
environment shows however that the migrants have been initiating and financing large scale
agricultural projects such as village and inter-village cooperatives, irrigation schemes, etc. It is
also undeniable that remittances have been promoting technological change at the household
level.
This article investigates the claim that the poor performance of agriculture is due to moral
hazard effects
2. It first attempts to compare the adoption of technology and labour productivity
in migrant and non-migrant households on the basis of recent survey data (Section 2). It then
develops a theoretical model to show formally that the financial guaranties offered by the
implicit insurance contract between the migrant and his family tend to encourage rent-seeking
behaviour (Section 3). A production function using panel data with household-specific fixed
effects is estimated to test this hypothesis (Section 4). The robustness of the conclusion of
technical inefficiency is then studied carefully (Section 5). Section 6 concludes with a
summary of the findings of the paper.
                                                          
2 Moral hazard occurs when an insured takes actions that increase the probability and/or size of his or her losses
for which corresponding penalties cannot be levied by insurers.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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2- Migration and agriculture: stylised facts
Most of the previous articles devoted to the Kayes area have attributed the persistence of a
low-yielding agriculture to the shortage of labour caused by migration and the non-productive
use of remittances (Bradley,  Raynaut et  Torrealba, 1977;  Weigel, 1982;  Papazian et
Aghassian, 1983). This diagnosis is however refuted by a recent four-month field survey we
conducted in eight villages of the area
3. Our survey data actually suggest a positive correlation
between out-migration and its after-effects (remittances) and the number of productive
agricultural assets possessed by rural households. They also reveal a large recourse by migrant
households to agricultural workers in order to compensate for the potential lack of family
labour. Following Meillassoux (1975), we define the household as "a group of individuals
who produce in common on at least one field and receive food out of a common store". We
set another condition for defining the migrant household: that at least one person who was
previously a member of the household has left for more than six months to live or work
elsewhere, either in Mali or abroad. Women who out-migrated for marriage and children
below 18 years of age at the time of interviews are excluded.
The figures presented in tables 1a and 1b show that the adoption of modern agricultural
implements (ox plough, cart) is strongly and positively correlated with out-migration.
Generally speaking, the more costly the equipment, the more significant the differences in
adoption between migrant and non-migrant households. As correlation is by no means
synonymous with causality, what is important to notice here is that the acquisition of
productive agricultural assets by migrant households always followed migration.
                                                          
3 The survey Migration et Transferts, 1997 was conducted by the author between January and April 1997. A
sample of 305 farm households was drawn from eight villages located in the Kayes area, on the Senegal River.
The objectives of the study were to identify the determinants of out-migration and to assess the economic impact
of migration and remittances on rural development.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Table 1a: Percentage of cultivating households owning modern agricultural implements by migration status, 1997
Type of household
All Migrant Non migrant z
(*) P>|z|
(n=299) (n=221) (n=78)
Donkey plough 19 20 15 -0.89 0.38
Ox plough 51 58 28 -4.66 0.00
Cart 46 53 26 -4.27 0.00
Sowing machine 13 15 9 -1.33 0.19
Sources: Enquête Migration et Transferts, 1997
(*) Mean comparison test
NB: The average prices are 45 000 Fcfa for a donkey plough, 50 000 Fcfa for an ox plough, 135 000 Fcfa for a
cart and 75 000 Fcfa for a sowing machine.
Table 1b: Percentage of cultivating households owning more than one agricultural implement by migration status,
1997
Type of household
All Migrant Non migrant z P>|z|
(n=299) (n=221) (n=78)
Ox (or donkey) plough + Sowing machine+ Cart 9 10 6 -1.04 0.30
Ox (or donkey) plough + Cart 41 48 23 -3.85 0.00
Ox (or donkey) plough + Sowing  machine 12 14 8 -1.37 0.17
Sources: Enquête Migration et Transferts, 1997
The data on average household expenditure on fertiliser, rented equipment and hired labour
presented in table 2 show a similar pattern. During the 1996 wet season, migrant households
spent 1.75 time as much on agricultural inputs as did non-migrant households. Average
expenses on hired labour and rented equipment are, in particular, much higher in the migrant
sample, insofar as they balance the lack of able-bodied workers among migrant households.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Table 2: Average household expenditure 








(****) 193 194 188 -0.12 0.90
Rented equipment 3,785 4,280 2,383 -1.91 0.06
Hired labour 6,248 7,034 4,024 -2.57 0.01
Total 10,227 11,508 6,594 -2.71 0.01
Sources: Enquête Migration et Transferts, 1997
(*) For each household, total expenditures on agricultural inputs were divided by the number of male cultivators
working on the farm (in the sahelian context of extensive farming, the number of male cultivators working on the
farm is a good proxy for the size of cultivated land).
(**) In 1996, the exchange rate was approximately US$1=Fcfa 600.
(***) Mean comparison test
(****) Many cultivating households use both chemical fertilisers and manure. Due to insufficient data, the latter is
not considered here.
The variation in the proportion of households owning agricultural productive assets being
great among the two sub-samples, the proportion of land cultivated with modern techniques is
also significantly higher among migrant households than among non-migrants (table 3).
Table 3: Proportion of plots cultivated with modern techniques by migration status, during the 1996 wet season
Type of household




(*)  30 31 28 -0.70 0.49
% cultivated plots
with plough 77 80 70 -2.49 0.01
Sources: Enquête Migration et Transferts, 1997
 (*) including manure
We thus find evidence to support the hypothesis that the process of migration, through the
inflow of resources and information, has contributed towards promoting the adoption of
modern techniques among migrant households. Our sample being restricted to 299
agricultural households, these results should of course be handled with care. However, they
tend to show that, through diversification of income sources, migration may have succeeded
in partly relaxing the credit and/or risk constraints faced by rural families.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Our survey data on family and hired labour challenge the second usual hypothesis underlying
much thinking on the  Kayes area, according to which migrant families would be totally
deprived of able-bodied workers (table 4).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Table 4 : Percentage distribution of resident household members by sex, age and migration status
Type of household
All Migrant Non migrant t
(*) P>|t|
(n=299) (n=221) (n=78)
Males 8.7 (45.3%) 9.8 (45.2%) 5.8 (46.8%)  -5.23 0.00
0-14 years old 4.1 (21.4%) 4.7 (21.8%) 2.5 (20.2%) -4.87 0.00
14-65 years old 4.1 (21.4%) 4.5 (20.8%) 3.1 (25.0%) -3.93 0.00
65 years old and over 0.5 (2.5%) 0.6 (2.8%) 0.3 (2.4%) -2.93 0.00
Females 10.5 (54.6%) 11.9 (54.8%) 6.6 (53.2%)  -5.99 0.00
0-14 years old 3.9 (20.5 %) 4.4 (20.3%) 2.5 (20.2%) -4.48 0.00
14-65 years old 6.0 (31.2%) 6.8 (31.3 %) 3.7 (29.8%) -6.15 0.00
65 years old and over 0.6 (3.0%) 0.7 (3.2%) 0.4 (3.2%) -2.34 0.02
All 19.2 (100%) 21.7 (100%) 12.4 (100%)  -5.87 0.00
% households with 21 25 10 -2.82 0.01
permanent labourers
Sources: Enquête Migration et Transferts, 1997
 (*) A c² test is used for the percentage of households with permanent labourers.
On average, household size is much bigger in the migrant category than in the non-migrant
one. With regard to age, the percentage distribution of household members does not
significantly differ between the two categories. However, migration flows result in a more
pronounced imbalance between males and females.
Losses of male labour are often partly compensated for by employing additional hired labour.
25% of migrant households hired at least one permanent labourer
4 during the 1996 wet
season, whereas this proportion was only 10% in the non-migrant sample. Agricultural wages
are generally paid by the migrants.
Lastly, our data on family labour show that the proportion of children and elderly among
cultivating members does not significantly differ between non-migrant and migrant
households. This result challenges the idea according to which migration would require more
work by members usually exempt from cultivating.
What about output levels ? The data given in table 5 show that despite a better endowment in
physical assets, out-migrant households paradoxically do not achieve higher yields (in terms
                                                          
4 The permanent labourer is usually employed for a crop season or a year. His remuneration consists of a fixed
wage and of fringe benefits such as free board and lodging.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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of the value of output per working household member
5) than non-migrant households. During
the 1996 wet season, mean yields were even significantly higher in the non-migrant category.
Table 5: Mean crop output by migration status, during  the 1995 and 1996 wet seasons (·1,000 Fcfa)
Type of household
All Migrant Non migrant t P>|t|
(n=299) (n=221) (n=78)
1996 crop output 366.8 386.2 311.6 -1.82 0.07
1996 crop output per working household member 41.8 39.1 49.6 2.42 0.04
1995 crop output 440.6 486.1 311.7 -3.96 0.00
1995 crop output per working household member 45.4 45.5 44.8 -0.17 0.87
Sources: Enquête Migration et Transferts, 1997
Even if our survey data lead to the same conclusion as that drawn up by previous studies (i.e.
the persistence of a low-yielding agriculture among migrant households), they tend to show
that this outcome is not due to a lack of workforce, nor to a non-productive use of remittances.
Following Udry (1996), we can enumerate many possible sources of variation in mean yields
between migrant and non migrant households. First, land quality may vary systematically
across plots controlled by migrant and non migrant households. If this were proved correct, it
could well explain migration itself. Second, crop or activity choice may be systematically
different by migration status. Indeed, as rural families choose to participate in migration, they
may alter their activity and crop-production mixes. Table 6 presents summary statistics
concerning the different crops grown by migrant and non migrant households on their
respective plots. Third, owing to conceivable imperfections in labour and land markets, there
may be variation across households in the shadow prices of factors of production and
therefore yield variation. Two additional sources of variation in yields may be mentioned:
migrant households may suffer output losses arising from a misuse of newly adopted
techniques. Lastly, migration may deprive households of their most skilled and motivated
members.
                                                          
5 Here again the number of household members working on the farm is a proxy for the size of cultivated land, in
a context of extensive farming.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Table 6: Percentage distribution of plots by primary crop and migration status, 1996
Type of household
All Migrant Non migrant
Primary crop (n=299) (n=221) (n=78)
Sorghum 11.1 10.1 15.5
Maize 18.5 16.7 26.1
Rice 15.0 16.0 10.6
Millet 1.3 1.1 2.0
Groundnuts 45.0 46.8 37.0
Gombo 7.6 7.9 5.6
Others 1.5 1.4 3.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Enquête Migration et Transferts, 1997
Despite the plausibility of all those explanations, direct field observation induces us to favour
an entirely different interpretation. Our theoretical hypothesis is that stagnation of agriculture
is best understood rather as being the outcome of the disincentive effect of remittances on the
productive behaviour of agricultural households. The financial support provided by the
migrants makes less essential the balance between production and cereal needs and could give
rise to rent-seeking behaviour. Such an opportunism could result in technical inefficiency,
where technical inefficiency is defined as the inability of an agricultural household to obtain
maximal output from a given set of inputs
6.
3- A theoretical model of rent-seeking
In the absence of well-functioning credit and insurance markets, which characterises most
rural areas of developing countries, the migration of a family member and its financial after-
effects meet two purposes: first, migration may contribute to ease the liquidity and risk
constraints faced by rural households and facilitate technological change through remittances
(Collier et  Lal, 1984 ; Stark, 1991). Second, migration can be viewed as part of a
diversification strategy that seeks to protect the household from production or, more generally,
income risks. This strategy implies that remittances from migrant workers respond to shocks
affecting the recipient families (Stark, 1991). Moral hazard is likely to appear as shocks, be
                                                          
6 As noted by Mochebelele and Winter-Nelson (2000), technical efficiency is a measure of management error,
rather than income or gross output. Lower inefficiency does not correspond to greater yields or greater income.
By applying fewer inputs in a consistent and timely manner, a "low-input" farmer could achieve a better technical
efficiency score than a farmer employing more inputs and achieving a higher yield.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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they climatic or idiosyncratic, are not directly observable by the migrants. This outcome can
be analysed in a consistent theoretical framework.
First, assume that, given the production technology and the state of nature, the agricultural
household can produce either Yh with probability p(le) or Yl with probability 1-p(le), where l is
the amount of labour input and e is the average level of effort applied to these units of labour
(le is labour in efficiency units). By assumption, p'>0 and p''<0.
Expected output level is thus given by:
[ ]Y ) le ( p 1 Y ) le ( p ) Y ( E l h - + = (1)
Net income from farm production is:
x Y - = P (2)
where x is the amount of material inputs other than labour. Output and input prices have been
normalised to one, since we are going to use only cross-sectional data in the empirical
implementation.
Let v(le) be the disutility of labour for the household, with v(0)=0, v'>0 and v''>0.
Expected utility when the household works le in efficiency units is, assuming risk neutrality:
) le ( v ) C ( E EU - = (3)
where C stands for the agricultural household's level of consumption.
Expected utility is maximised subject to the following cash-income and time constraints:
Y R C + + = P (4)
l 1- = leisure (5)
                                                                                                                                                                                    CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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R denotes remittances from internal and international migrants,  Y is exogenous income (e.g.
pension, rental income), and 1 is the total (normalised) time endowment.













l h Y Y
P
P    ,
where  P h (P l) is net income from farm production when output level is  Yh  (Yl ), and
C can be interpreted as the level of consumption such that basic needs are satisfied
7.
Lastly, let remittances be part of a contractual arrangement between the migrants and their
families and let this informal arrangement rest on a sense of distributive justice. Concerns for
justice imply that the migrants have the duty of satisfying the basic needs of their families
whenever they cannot do it themselves (i.e. whenever C falls below C ). In particular, a clause
in the contract binds the migrants to send funds (or consumer goods) each time their families
cannot establish entitlement over an adequate amount of food through purchase or through
food production
8. Such a transfer of general purchasing power from the migrants to their
families may be viewed as an informal tax aimed at re-allocating incomes between the modern
capitalist sector, located either in Mali or abroad, and the subsistence farming sector. This
family solidarity serves as a substitute for the welfare state of industrialised societies and, by
guaranteeing subsistence, provides what may be called a poverty insurance.
The implementation of distributive justice as described above is not Pareto efficient, however,
if we assume that the household's effort level is unobservable by the migrant. Imperfect
monitoring of effort implies that the migrant cannot ascertain whether low yields in his
family's fields are due to his relatives' idleness or to unfavourable weather conditions (or any
other unfavourable state of nature). It may thus induce the household to shirk and to rely on
the migrant for her subsistence.
                                                          
7 Quoting Kolm (1996), we define basic needs as "physiological needs for the adequate and normal functioning
of mind and body, and the requirements of social existence in norm-determined form of consumption and in
means of social relations".
8 Sen's notion of entitlement can be defined as the range of different goods that an economic agent can acquire.
The latter depends on what he owns, what exchange possibilities are offered to him, what is given to him free,
and what is taken from him (Sen, 1981)CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Following Fafchamps (1992), an effective way to prevent the occurrence of moral hazard is to
use punishment strategies. The migrant may, for example, threaten his family to break the
contractual arrangement by suspending remittances. Since the loss of the migrant's financial
support is very costly in intertemporal utility terms, the family has a strong incentive not to
shirk. This implies, however, that the migrant is able to check his family's work performance.
A comparison of family output with that of others can serve as an indicator of effort. Such a
scheme is often referred to as "yardstick competition" in industrial or labour economics
(Shleifer, 1985 ; Lazear et Rosen, 1981). Though compensation schemes based on relative
performance may provide an efficient mechanism for monitoring productivity, collusive
manipulation by participating firms or workers is often an important limitation of yardstick
competition (Shleifer, 1985). In the particular case of the Kayes area, some scope for collusion
is undeniably present. Agricultural households may for example collude in order to send false
signals to the migrants. Acts of collusion, such as the announcement of fictitious natural
disasters, were actually observed in the area. Moreover, peer pressure could make family
output an unreliable signal, for "zealous" families (i.e. those which do not take advantage of
their informational rent) could well be constrained by others to reduce their labour effort
9. Ex-
ante financial support is, according to  Fafchamps ( op.cit.), another way to prevent
opportunistic behaviour. In the case of the Kayes area, survey data suggest that even if the
bulk of remittances occurs after the harvest has been realised, some liquid assets are supplied
by the migrants prior to the crop season so that their families may have access to key factors
of production.
So far, our theoretical discussion has not taken into account the presence of another
informational asymmetry which would this time be beneficial to the migrant. Indeed, the
migrant freely decides whether he sends funds or not. If he decides not to, his family cannot
ascertain whether this decision is due to temporary money troubles or to his intentional
derogation of the contract. Various elements, among which directly moral motivations or
migrants' concern about other persons' opinions of them, induce us to believe that the migrants
do not take advantage of this informational asymmetry and that the implicit agreement to
assist others is enforced by social pressure. Yet, the possible occurrence of money troubles is
introduced in the model since it alters the reliability of the poverty insurance mechanism.
Let Y  the probability that the family be financially supported by the migrant be:
                                                          
9 The role of peer monitoring have been largely developed in the economic literature (see Stiglitz, 1990; Arnott











Y  is assumed to be positively correlated with the number of family out-migrants (Nm) divided
by the number of family members residing in the country of origin (N). The higher the ratio,
the smaller the number of individuals being financially supported by each migrant and the
more reliable the insurance mechanism.
Ex-post financial support implies that families suffering a shortfall in income receive an
amount of remittances  R in such a way that  Y C R - - ‡ P  with probability  Y and
Y C R - - < P  with probability  (1-Y). We can simplify the model by assuming that the
migrants send either an amount strictly equals to the consumption deficit ( Y C R - - = P )
with probability Y or no remittances at all ( 0 R = ) with probability (1-Y), whenever  Y Y l = .
Under these assumptions, the expected value of remittances is given by:
[ ] ) Y C ( ) le ( p 1 ) R ( E l - - - = P Y (7)
The optimisation problem facing each household is to choose a level of labour effort that
maximises expected utility, where expected utility is given by:
) le ( v Y ) R ( E ) ( E EU - + + = P (8)
[ ] ) le ( v ) C Y ( ) ( ) le ( p C ) Y ( ) 1 ( EU l l h l - - + + - + + + - = ￿ P Y P P Y P Y
The first-order condition is:
) C Y ( ) (
) le ( ' p
) le ( ' v
l l h - + + - = P Y P P (9)CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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From equation (9), the effect of increasing Y on optimal le can be derived from differentiating
the first-order condition. The resulting expression can be written as:
[ ]
) ( ) (
d dle
² ) le ( ' p







Ø ¢ ¢ - ¢ ¢
DP
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
C d Y d d d ) C Y ( l l
- + + -
- + + - + + Y Y P Y Y P (10)
where  P P DP l h - = .
The results of the comparative static experiments on the level of effort derived from the model
may be summarised as follows:
) C , Y , , , ( * le * le l - + + - + = P Y DP ,  (11)
Our model predicts an inverse relationship between the reliability of the insurance mechanism
and labour in efficiency units in a context of informational asymmetry. Labour effort also
decreases with the level of guaranteed consumption, while it increases with risk ( DP),
exogenous income and land quality (Pl).
Since we do not have reliable data on labour effort, equation (11) cannot be directly tested.
However, if the problem of moral hazard is pertinent per se, one should observe an inverse
relationship between the reliability of the insurance mechanism and the households' technical
efficiency. This outcome can be analysed formally.




Maximum output in our model is given by Yh, which corresponds to a level of effort le, such
that p(le)=1. Technical efficiency may thus be expressed as:CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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The main prediction of our model thus becomes: the more reliable the income-smoothing
mechanism, the higher the incentive to shirk, the lower the technical efficiency.
In the following section, we attempt to substantiate this hypothesis through the estimation of a
production function with household-specific effects using panel data.
4- Empirical implementation
Our first objective in this section is to construct a relevant indicator of each household's
unobserved technical efficiency with which to test the hypothesis formulated above. As part of
this effort, we estimate a production function with household-specific effects using our survey
data. Though interviews were realised on a unique round basis, each household in our sample
simultaneously cultivates multiple plots (8 is the average number of plots per household in
1996) and many different crops. Detailed agronomic information on each cultivated plot
provides an unusual opportunity to estimate a production function using plot-level data.
We then use the measure of unobservable household-specific technical efficiency to explicitly
test the main prediction of our theoretical model.
4-1-The econometric model
Let the production technology on each plot be described by the function :
) , , G , W , X ( g ih h i ih ih q m , (14.a)
where i index plots of land and h index households (i=1,…,P, h=1,…,H); Xih is a vector of
physical inputs on plot i; Wi is a vector of observable plot characteristics; Gih is a vector ofCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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characteristics of the individual who controls the plot; mh is a measure of unobservable (by the
migrant) household characteristics and qih is a disturbance term that summarises the effects of
unobserved plot quality variables and plot-specific production shocks.
Let  ) exp( ). G , W , X ( g ) , , G , W , X ( g ih h ih i ih ih h i ih ih q m q m + =
Once logarithms are taken on both sides, the production function is given by:
q m ih h ih i ih ih ) G , W , X ( g ln Y ln + + = (14.b)
mh may be treated either as a fixed effect or as a random effect (Greene, 1997, p.615). The
fixed effects approach takes mh  to be a household constant term in the regression model. The
appropriate estimator in that case is usually referred to as the "within-groups" or "fixed
effects" estimator. By contrast, the random effects approach specifies that mh is a household
specific disturbance, similar to qih. The model may then be estimated by generalised least
squares which yield unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates. Although it is possible to
argue for one or the other model, the main problem with the random effects approach is that
unobserved heterogeneity, embodied in the error component mh, may be correlated with
observed inputs. In the presence of such correlation, least squares and generalised least
squares yield biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters. The traditional technique to
overcome this problem is to use a fixed effects procedure, i.e. to purge the household-specific
effect  mh by transforming the data into deviations from household means ( Hausman and
Taylor, 1981). In that case, a sufficient condition for the OLS estimates from the transformed
variables to be unbiased and consistent is that the elements X and W are uncorrelated with the
classical disturbance term q.
A test for  orthogonality of the random effects and the  regressors has been proposed by
Hausman (1978). It is based on the idea that under the hypothesis of no correlation, the fixed
and random effects estimates should not differ systematically. In our case, use of a random
effects approach was statistically rejected in favour of a fixed effects approach
10
( 3 . 592 Chi2
48 = ).
                                                          
10 Following Hausman and Taylor (1981), another possible approach is to find instruments for those columns of
X and W which are potentially correlated with mh. The authors suggest in particular to use the columns of X and W
that are  uncorrelated with  mh as instruments. Since the non-correlation assumptions cannot be tested in all
circumstances, however, this method did not hold our attention.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Still, two potential limitations may arouse scepticism with regard to the use of a fixed effects
procedure.  First, transforming the data into deviations from household means sweeps out all
plot-invariant variables from the regression.  Since our model does not include such variables,
however, the estimation procedure based on within-groups estimators seems to be relevant.
Second, inputs may be correlated with the disturbance term qih. An instrumental variable
procedure could overcome this problem, but no  exogenously determined instruments are
available.
Once equation (13.b) is estimated, the hypothesis that we want to test is whether the reliability
of the insurance mechanism, denoted by Y in our theoretical model, is negatively correlated
with the household's unobserved level of productivity, measured by mh. In order to do this, we
will regress the household-specific fixed effects on a vector of observable household
characteristics including our proxy for Y.
4-2- The data
The data used for this study are drawn from the farm household survey we conducted in the
Kayes area. On the whole, 305 households in eight villages have been concerned with this
survey which includes three types of data:
- General information about each member of the families at the time of interviews: sex, age,
education, main and secondary activities, place of residence, migratory experience, etc.
- Information on each cultivated plot. Data include size of plot, location of plot, type of crop,
production levels, amounts of male and female labour inputs and amounts of other inputs
such as hired labour, fertiliser and equipment. Data allow to identify the individuals who
control each plot. Information on farm operations, inputs and outputs on each of the
households' plots concerns the 1996 wet season
- Detailed information on wealth, income and expenses for each active member of the
families in 1996.
The farming system is characteristic of rain-fed agriculture in  sahelian Africa. Active
members of a household (both male and female) work on common plots, the output from
which is used for the basic consumption needs of the household. In addition, each member of
the household cultivates one (or more) individual plot and has an entire control over the
output from his fields. Crop choice is different by gender: plots controlled by men areCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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generally devoted to cereals (sorghum and maize) while plots controlled by women are
devoted to groundnuts. After eliminating observations with missing data, the sample consists
of 291 farm households with usable data on a total of 2,248 cultivated plots.
4-3- The model specification
The last important issue to be addressed involves the specification of the functional form for
) G , W , X ( g ih i ih . Cases of zero-values of some input variables in our data set make the Cobb-
Douglas specification inappropriate. One option to solve the problem is to confine the analysis
to only those farmers who have positive values of the key inputs. However, this method is not
satisfactory, since it may result in seriously biased estimators. Another option is offered by
Battese (1997), who shows that the "zero-observation" problem in the estimation of Cobb-
Douglas production function may be solved by the use of dummy variables such that efficient
estimators are obtained using the full data set. The functional form that is implemented is thus
given by:
q m a a a g ih h ih g i w ih x ih G ln W ln )] D , X ( ln[ D Y ln max + + + + + = (15)
where D=1 if Xih=0 and D=0 if Xih>0
The following variables are introduced in the regression:
-  Physical inputs (Xih): number of male cultivators aged 14-65, number of female cultivators
aged 14-65, hired labour costs (including seasonal workers' wages)
,  use of fertiliser
(dummy variable with value 1 if fertiliser was used on the plot, 0 otherwise), use of
equipment (dummies); number of ploughing tools ;
-  Observable plot characteristics (Wi): type of crop (dummies), location of plot (distance
from village), type of plot (dummy variable with value 1 if common and 0 if individual),
type of crop interacted with type of plot, type of crop interacted with village dummies
(which capture climatic and environmental effects). Due to unreliable data, we do not have
any precise information on plot areas. However, in a context of extensive farming, there is
a very strong correlation between labour input and plot area, so that labour input combined
with agricultural implements may be used as a proxy for the surface of a plot.
-  Observable characteristic of the individual who controls the plot (Gih) : age (sex is not
introduced here since it is strongly correlated with the type of the plot).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Summary statistics for variables are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: Summary statistics for variables
Variable Obs Sample  Sample standard Min Max
mean deviation
1996 production (kg) 2,464 256 527 0.75 10,500
Male labour (1 if no male labour) (%) 2,474 36.3 48.1 0 1
Number of male cultivators 2,474 2.4 2.7 0 15
Female labour (1 if no female labour) (%) 2,474 18.8 39.1 0 1
Number of female cultivators 2,474 1.4 1.4 0 15
Hired labour (1 if no hired labour) (%) 2,501 15.2 35.9 0 1
Hired labour costs (local currency) 2,501 3,100 17,111 0 360,000
Fertiliser (dummy) (%) 2,503 18.8 39.1 0 1
Ox or donkey plough (dummy) (%) 2,503 55.8 49.7 0 1
Number of ploughing tools 2,503 1.1 0.3 0 5
Sowing machine (dummy) (%) 2,503 5.8 23.4 0 1
Type of plot (1: common 0: individual) (%) 2,503 22.6 41.8 0 1
Plot location (distance from village, km) 2,316 1.90 1.75 0.1 15
Plot planted in sorghum (dummy) (%) 2,503 13.1 33.8 0 1
Type of plot · Plot planted in sorghum (%) 2,503 11.4 31.7 0 1
Plot planted in maize (dummy) (%) 2,503 19.9 39.9 0 1
Type of plot · Plot planted in maize (%) 2,503 10.4 30.5 0 1
Plot planted in rice (dummy) (%) 2,503 7.0 25.6 0 1
Type of plot · Plot planted in rice (%) 2,503 0.2 4.0 0 1
Plot planted in groundnut (dummy) (%) 2,503 51.5 50.0 0 1
Type of plot · Plot planted in groundnut (%) 2,503 0.2 4.9 0 1
Age of the plot manager (years) 2,463 39 15 11 82
Data reveal that 22.6% of the plots are common ones and that crop choice is quite different by
type of plot, which reflects the gender division of labour mentioned in the preceding section.
4-4- Estimation and results
Table 8 reports the results of estimating equation  (14). Only the coefficients on physical
inputs, location of plot, type of plot and type of plot · type of crop are reported, but village
indicators interacted with type of crop were also included in the regression
11. Even if the
analysis of technical efficiency is concerned primarily with the error terms rather than the
parameter estimates, some results command attention. First, all input coefficients have
positive and highly significant coefficients. The estimated coefficient for the dummy variable
for no plough use is significantly negative implying that the intercept of the productionCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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function is lower for farmers who do not use ploughing implements. Conversely, the
estimated coefficient for the dummy variable for no labour use is significantly positive
implying that the intercept of the production function is higher for farmers who do not hire
labour. The reason for this result may be as follows. Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) have
shown that whenever a worker is not the sole residual claimant of farm profits there is an
incentive problem relative to work effort. This implies that hired labour is more costly than
family labour because it either requires supervisory inputs by family members or it leads to
less effort without supervision. Second, plots' distance from village appears to be positively
related to production levels up to a certain point (around 6.5 kilometres). More distant plots,
however, are associated with lower production levels. Such a pattern may be due to high fixed
travel costs to providing labour on distant plots. Lastly, common plots, generally controlled by
household heads, have significantly higher output than individual plots controlled by women.
This result may be due to systematic differences in the size or quality of land farmed by men
and women, or to differences in labour intensity as women often combine cultivation
activities with care for their children (Udry, 1996).
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 Interaction effects were also included to test the hypothesis of an identical technology across plots controlled
by migrant and non-migrant households. Results indicated that the hypothesis cannot be rejectedCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Table 8: Cobb Douglas production function: regression results
Dependent variable: Log (plot production, kg)
Variables Parameters Coef. t P>|t|
Intercept a0 2.57 7.12 0.00 ***
Physical inputs (Xih)
Male labour dummy ax1 0.03 0.48 0.63
Log(number of male cultivators) ax2 0.18 3.50 0.00 ***
Female labour dummy ax3 - 0.12 - 0.18 0.18
Log(number of female cultivators) ax4 0.14 2.81 0.00 ***
Hired labour dummy ax5 0.61 2.07 0.04 **
Log(hired labour costs) ax6 0.10 2.90 0.00 ***
Fertiliser dummy ax7 0.13 2.14 0.03 **
Ox or donkey plough dummy ax8 - 0.13 - 2.47 0.01 **
Log(number of ploughing tools) ax9 0.38 3.41 0.00 ***
Sowing machine ax10 0.42 3.68 0.00 ***
Observable plot characteristics (Wi)
Distance from village aw1 0.13 3.97 0.00 ***
Distance² aw2 - 0.01 - 2.74 0.01 ***
Type of plot (1: common 0: individual) aw3 0.91 3.41 0.00 ***
Sorghum dummy aw4 0.12 0.39 0.69
Type of plot · Sorghum dummy aw5 1.16 3.99 0.00 ***
Maize dummy aw6 0.57 2.00 0.05 **
Type of plot · Maize dummy aw7 0.34 1.20 0.23
Rice dummy aw8 - 0.82 - 2.72 0.01 ***
Type of plot · Rice dummy aw9 - 0.67 - 1.15 0.25
Groundnut dummy aw10 0.52 2.04 0.04 **
Type of plot · Groundnut dummy aw11 - 1.10 - 2.54 0.01 **
Type of crop · Village dummies (28 dummies) (not reported here)
Observable characteristic of the plot manager (Gih)
Age  ag 0.01 7.86 0.00 ***
Specification test 28 . 592
2
48 = c




Note.- All the dummies relative to labour or ox plough take the value one when no labour or no ox plough was
used on the plot (zero otherwise). Thus we expect negative signs. The omitted crop category is "all others"
(millet, earth peas, gombo and fonio). *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at
1% level.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Now that equation (14) has been estimated, the hypothesis that we want to test is whether the
reliability of the insurance mechanism is negatively correlated with our measure of
unobservable household-specific productivity level. We thus regress the household-specific
fixed effect predicted from equation (14) on a vector of observable household characteristics.
The latter includes the size of the household, the percentage of educated members within the
household, a dummy variable indicating whether the household had any off-farm wages or
rents during 1996, dummy variables related to the household's social status
12, the number of
individual plots divided by the total number of cultivated plots among the household, and the
number of out-migrants divided by the number of residents members in the household. In
order to get a dependable indicator of the reliability of the poverty insurance mechanism, each
migrant was first weighted by his estimated propensity to remit (see appendix for details). A
dummy variable indicating whether the main ethnic group of the village is kassonké is also
included.
The results from estimation of the OLS equation are presented in table 9.
                                                          
12 As one might expect, the survey we carried out included no direct question on social status. However,
households' last name is a very reliable indicator of social status. Consider, for instance, the  Diabira and
Sarambounou families in the village of Gakoura, the Konaté family in the village of Fanguiné, the Sissoko family
in both the villages of Moussawaguia and Djimékon and the Kouma family in the village of Kérouané, all belong
to the upper social strata (i.e. all have a long period of residence in the village or can trace their ancestry back to
the founders of the village).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Table 9: OLS regression results
Dependent variable: Predicted household-specific fixed effects ( m ˆ h )
Variables Coef. t P>|t|
Intercept - 0.21 - 1.11 0.27
Household observable characteristics
Sum of weighted out-migrants/household size - 1.17 - 1.97 0.05 **
% of educated members in the household - 0.02 - 0.07 0.94
Household size -0.001 - 0.33 0.74
Number of individual plots/total number of cultivated plots - 0.95 - 3.31 0.00 ***
Social status (dummies)
Noble 0.15 1.78 0.08 *
Artisan caste  0.04 0.28 0.78
Off-farm work (dummy) - 0.11 - 1.30 0.20
Village observable characteristic
Main ethnic group (dummy: 1 if kassonké) 1.09 12.59 0.00 ***
Number of observations 291
F(8, 282) 27.94
Prob>F 0.00
Adjusted R²  0.44
Note.- t-ratios and test statistics are based on heteroscedastic-consistent estimates of the variance-covariance
matrix. The omitted social category is "all others" (former slaves, shepherds). *: significant at 10% level,
**: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level.
Estimates indicate that the null hypothesis of moral hazard, corresponding to a statistically
negative coefficient associated with our measure of insurance reliability, is strongly supported
by the data. The implicit insurance contractual arrangement between the migrants and their
family could thus partly explain the poor performance of agriculture among migrant
households.
This result is reproduced in figure 1 using predicted technical efficiencies, where predicted
technical efficiencies are given by (Chaffai, 1997):
) ˆ ˆ exp( EFFI h h m m - = ,
where m m ˆ max ˆ h
h
=  with  1 EFFI 0 £ £ .CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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The average technical efficiency of households very involved in remunerative migration (the
best insured) appears to be much lower than that of less involved households.
Households' technical efficiency appears to be influenced by other variables. The negative
sign associated with the proportion of individual plots reflects the rise in labour costs with
operational farm scale (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986): the greater the family size, the
greater the incentive problem for each individual family worker, as shares in profits are
diluted. The positive sign associated with social status may reflect the fact that members who
can trace their ancestry back to the founders of the village (Popkin talks about "insiders", see
Popkin, 1979) are entitled to plots of greater size and/or higher fertility. Lastly, households'
efficiency appears to be higher in kassonké villages. The explanation may be as follows: the
involvement of kassonké villages in migration is more recent and far less intense than in
neighbouring villages. Acts of collusion between households and peer pressure are thus less
likely to appear, and a comparison of family output with that of others may provide the
migrants with an efficient mechanism for monitoring productivity.
Figure 1 : Trade-off between technical efficiency and the                












 insurance mechanismCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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5- Robustness
Several objections may be raised with the results presented thus far. The most important one
concerns our interpretation of Y. First, does Y properly measure the effect of the reliability of
the insurance mechanism on technical efficiency ? Following Greene (1997, p.981), the
answer is no if the typical household who chooses to purchase insurance through migration
would be relatively less efficient whether or not she migrated. The problem here is one of self-
selection. If this argument is proved correct, then it implies that the least squares coefficient in
the regression of m on Y actually overestimates the insurance effect. What we have to do,
thus, is to separate moral hazard effects from potential selection effects in the efficiency
model. As part of this effort, we adopt the approach used in Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993).
We construct a model based on a dichotomous selection mechanism known as a "treatment
effects model" in the empirical literature
13. Estimation techniques are as follows (Heckman,
1979): we first model insurance decisions (migration participation) as a dichotomous choice.
The model is estimated as a  probit equation using maximum likelihood methods. The
estimated coefficients are used to compute the selection variable which is incorporated, in a
second stage, in the efficiency model (see appendix for details). A test for selectivity bias is a
test for a correlation between the errors of the probit and the corrected OLS regressions being
not significantly different from zero. The results are presented in table A3.  Since there does
not appear to be significant correlation between the error terms, the selection variable and,
consequently, household self-selection do not play much of a role in our analysis.
Second, it may be argued that our measure for Y should be viewed not as an indicator of the
reliability of the poverty insurance mechanism, but rather as a "human capital depreciation
rate". Such an argument is based on the idea that the migrants are the most skilled and
motivated members of the household and that any new migration induces a decrease in the
mean (unobservable) dynamism of those left behind. It is the latter effect that would be
captured by  Y. Indirect arguments may contribute to disprove such an hypothesis. In a
previous study, we showed that the migration decision of an individual was strongly
influenced by his or her household status. Sons are more likely to migrate and, in line with
law of primogeniture, eldest sons are more likely to migrate. To our knowledge, no study has
ever proved that elders were more dynamic and therefore more migration prone than their
                                                          
13 A tobit two-stage method is also applicable here since Y is a censored variable.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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younger counterparts. Even if we were assured of it, nothing would tell that a migration prone
individual is also a successful peasant. Lastly, remember that, in our calculations, each
migrant is weighted by his estimated propensity to remit. As non remitters, non economic
migrants (students, tied-movers, etc.) are associated with low weights even though their
migration is likely to have exacerbated qualified labour shortages within the family.
6- Conclusions
The description of our survey data has revealed that although migration has certainly helped
the adoption of improved agricultural technology, migrant households do not show better
performance than non-migrant households. Our theoretical assumption is that the implicit
insurance contractual arrangement between the migrant and his family gives rise to
opportunistic behaviour which results in technical inefficiencies among migrant households.
The estimation of a production function using panel data with household-specific fixed effects
does not reject the hypothesis. The sum of weighted out-migrants divided by the household
size, which is a proxy of the reliability of the insurance mechanism, has a significant and
negative effect on households' unobserved level of productive endowment. The hypothesis of
a trade-off between insurance and labour efficiency has already been mentioned in the
economic literature (Fafchamps, 1992). The original feature of this article is to show that such
a trade-off is likely to be observed in the specific context of contractual arrangements between
a migrant and his family.
Had the migrant reliable signals on the labour effort of his family, moral hazard issues could
be minimised. This would however imply a radical change in the relative powers of the
migrant and his family. This change could in turn have consequential effects on the economic
side by reviving rivalries between individuals.
Despite a negative effect of migration and remittances on technical efficiency, one should not
forget that, on a regional scale, remittances constitute the only reliable mechanism to protect
agricultural households from food-insecurity. Without the financial support of the migrants,
the two droughts of 1973 and 1984 would have had much worse consequences.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Appendix
RELIABILITY OF THE INSURANCE MECHANISM: MIGRANTS' WEIGHTS COMPUTATION
The migrants do not constitute an homogeneous group and do not have, in particular, the same
propensity to remit, the latter being strongly dependent on individual characteristics. We thus
computed individual predicted probabilities to remit through the estimation of a probit model.
The dependent variable is dichotomous and has values one (or zero) if the migrant is a
remitter (or is not a remitter). Each migrant was then weighted by his estimated propensity to
remit.
Table A1 : Probit model of remittances
Variables Coefficients  Marginal effects z P>|z|
Intercept - 5.26 - 7.06 0.00 ***
Age 0.19 0.070 5.00 0.00 ***
Age²/100 - 0.20 -0.073 - 4.20 0.00 ***
International out-migrant 0.47 0.176 2.80 0.01 ***
France 1.44 0.483 7.96 0.00 ***
Household head 1.11 0.286 2.60 0.01 ***
Brother 0.61 0.206 2.77 0.01 ***
Son 0.85 0.287 4.65 0.00 ***




                   0                  1                Total
Actual 0 169 52 211
1                  64               275                 339
Total 233 327 560
Note.-  ***: significant at 1% level
Mean predicted probabilities by place of residence are given in table A2.
Table A2 : Mean predicted probabilities by place of residence
Mean Standard error n
Internal migrant 0.26 0.18 175
International migrant 0.77 0.27 385
France 0.90 0.13 276
Any foreign country except France 0.42 0.20 109CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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TEST FOR SELECTIVITY BIAS
The procedure described below is the one proposed by Heckman (1979).
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As before, technical efficiency depends on household characteristics and on migration
participation:
v M Z ' ˆ h h h h + + = x b m (A.2)
(u,v)~bivariate normal [0,0,su,sv,r].
If it is the case that migrant households are self-selected, then uh and vh are correlated and
least squares estimates of x will overestimate the insurance effect.
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F are the probability density and cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution, respectively, defined over the observable variables which determine migration
status. W can be treated as a missing variable in equation (A.2) . By finding instruments for
this variable, it can be added to the specification of equation  (A.2) which can then be
consistently estimated by OLS.
A two-stage method is used to estimate the model. In the first stage, a  probit model of
migration participation provides estimates of g. These estimates are then used to estimate W.
In the second stage, this variable is added to equation (A.2) and the following equation is
estimated:
h W rs x b m h h h h h ˆ M Z ' ˆ + + + =   (A.3)
 where r is the correlation between error terms u and v.
In order to get consistent and fully efficient estimates of the parameters, we use the maximum
likelihood procedure to estimate the model. The results are presented in table A3.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2000.17
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Table A3: Results of the selection model
Variables Coef. z P>|z|
Selection (probit) equation
Intercept - 0.16 - 0.21 0.83
Village dummies
Djimékon - 1.17 - 2.52 0.01 **
Fanguiné - 0.04 - 0.11 0.91
Kérouané - 0.95 - 2.85 0.00 ***
Moussawaguia 0.07 0.12 0.90
Dyalla - 0.72 - 1.79 0.07 *
Somankidi - 0.45 - 1.12 0.26
Diakandapé - 0.52 - 1.26 0.21
% of educated members in the household 0.79 1.39 0.16
Household size 0.04 2.87 0.00 ***
Number of individual plots/total number of cultivated plots - 0.99 - 1.76 0.08 *
Age of household head 0.02 1.79 0.07 *
Social status (dummies)
Noble - 0.16 - 0.63 0.53
Artisan caste  0.15 0.28 0.78
Off-farm work (dummy) - 0.40 - 1.73 0.08 *
Corrected regression
Insurance (migration dummy) - 0.25 - 1.74 0.08 *
% of educated members in the household - 0.03 - 0.15 0.88
Household size 0.003 0.63 0.53
Number of individual plots/total number of cultivated plots - 0.87 - 3.53 0.00 ***
Social status (dummies)
Noble 0.15 1.30 0.19
Artisan caste  0.003 0.01 0.99
Off-farm work (dummy) - 0.10 - 1.22 0.22
Main ethnic group (dummy: 1 if kassonké) 1.10 11.43 0.00 ***
s 0.65 24.16 0.00 ***
r - 0.05 - 0.27 0.79
Number of observations 291
Log likelihood - 413.9
Note.-  *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level.
The z=-0.27, not significantly different from zero result suggests that there is no significant
correlation between the errors in (A.1) and (A.2). The estimated coefficients in table A3 do not
change much when W  is dropped from the regression. As a result, household self-selection
does not play much role in our analysis.